A package manager trusts a repository because of signatures, and a repository is only as trustworthy as the signatures it keeps, checks and makes. Depotify treats signatures as data with rules, not as decoration.

Signed repository indexes

dnf and apt check a repository's index before they install anything. Depotify signs those indexes itself — repomd.xml.asc for RPM, InRelease and Release.gpg for Debian — with OpenPGP code of its own, no gpg on the server.

  • One key or many. A key for the whole site, one per tool, or one per repository.
  • Generated or yours. Depotify can generate an RSA 4096 or Ed25519 key, or use the one you already have, exported from gpg, with or without a passphrase. Keys are stored owner-only and never replaced behind the clients' back.
  • Rotation without breaking clients. A new key starts signing while the old one keeps signing beside it for a transition period, so clients can learn the new key before the old one goes.
  • Public keys on hand. Each repository serves its public key and the exact lines a client needs to trust it.

Signatures checked on upload

When a package that carries a signature is uploaded, Depotify verifies it and records the result next to the package — verified, unknown key, unsupported, unsigned, waiting for its signature, or bad — and shows it as a badge and a column in the browser.

  • A bad signature is refused outright.
  • A repository can refuse unsigned packages, and says so to clients before they upload.
  • A detached signature can arrive before or after its package; it waits for the content it signs, and the pair is judged together.

The better-signed copy wins

Two uploads of the same package — same repository, same path — are not a conflict to be refused blindly. If the new copy is better signed than the one stored (verified beats unknown key, which beats unsigned), it takes its place; the old copy goes to the trash and the audit log records both verdicts. Equal or worse is refused, with both verdicts in the message.

This never touches a release: what a repository or an ecosystem marks as released does not change, by signature or otherwise.

Clients that trust your server

Internal servers often use a certificate authority of their own, and every client handles that differently. Depotify's help page shows the CA's fingerprint and download, and how to trust it on Fedora, RHEL, AlmaLinux, Debian, Ubuntu, macOS and Windows — system-wide or for one tool only: git, Mercurial, Subversion, dnf, apt, pip, Conan, Docker, Podman, curl. It also lists the messages each client prints when it does not trust a server, and the ones that really mean "not reachable", each linked to the fix.

The help page: the CA's fingerprint and the exact commands for each system
The help page: the CA's fingerprint and the exact commands for each system

Built on a platform that signs its own code

Depotify runs on FFS, which loads only plugins signed by a release engineer and checked against a certificate chain compiled into the server — and is installed from signed packages itself. Every repository tool is such a plugin.